Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to begin by thanking the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and the Civil Center for National Initiative for convening this timely event commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Taif Agreement. I would also like to thank Speaker Husseini for his thoughtful remarks. It is an honor to be asked to speak alongside a leader who played a key role for Lebanon in bringing about the Agreement which was to end 15 years of civil war.
I was myself briefly present in Taif, in a very much more junior capacity as a diplomat summoned to be briefed with others by Prince Saud al Faisal and Lakhdar Ibrahimi on the point reached in their efforts. Taif was an achievement for Lebanon. It was also an achievement for Arab diplomacy, and most of us representatives of the wider international community were largely passive observers and well-wishers. King Fahd and his colleagues had succeeded in persuading the Arab states most directly involved in Lebanon at the time – Syria and Iraq – to stand back, and two of the Arab world’s most distinguished diplomats were at the heart of an Arab effort to craft - with Lebanon’s leaders - an acceptable agreement.
Little more than a year later I was back in Taif in grimmer circumstances, visiting the Kuwaiti government in exile which had then taken refuge there. The Kuwait war regionally, and the intra-confessional fighting which for a time continued in Lebanon, complicated the early implementation of Taif and nobody would say that the course of history since, in Lebanon or the region, has run smoothly.
But the Agreement has endured. The constitutional and confessional balance it established is the one to which Lebanon still works. The principles enshrined in it, though at times severely challenged, still inform our daily lives here in a way which cannot be said of many other parts of the region – freedom, coexistence, equality, the rule of law…
We are now passing through yet another dark period in the region’s history, and Lebanon faces acute challenges. But reading Taif – as I confess I did for the first time in two and half decades when first asked to speak here – one is reminded of how much there is to protect, even though it also highlights how much more remains to be done.
The United Nations was quick to endorse Taif in November 1989. The Security Council welcomed it as an “essential stage on the road to restoring the Lebanese state and establishing renovated institutions“ and underlined that it was the only basis for “the restoration of the unity, independence and sovereignty of the Lebanese state”. Repeatedly the Security Council has come back to this – resolution 1701 for example, the cornerstone of the UN’s mission here, explicitly looks back to and reaffirms the centrality of, Taif.
In signaling an end to the civil war the Taif Agreement sought to provide an immediate framework for the post war order based on national reconciliation and the search for unity. The immediate goal was peace, and a return to a measure of stability after 15 years of civil war. But it also looked forward to the eventual transformation of the Lebanese state.
I would like if I may to look briefly – and with all due modesty as an observer who has been in Lebanon for only three years and therefore has to rely heavily on hearsay to support his argument – at what has been achieved in the twenty five years since agreement was reached in Taif, and then, very tentatively, to examine what might now be priorities. Finally I will touch – again briefly, since those participating in the conference will have ample opportunity to look at the issues very thoroughly over the next days - at what the international community can do to help.
So, what has been achieved…?
First and foremost the peace which Taif heralded has held. Yes, Lebanon has experienced friction and at times violence. But there has been no return to the consuming internal conflict which cost over one hundred thousand lives, led to nearly one million leaving the country and left thousands of people disappeared or missing. There is I hope, and believe, a determination here still, at almost every level, to avoid a return to such conflict. The Taif arrangements, and the principle of multi-confessional consensus and coexistence which is at their heart, have been central to that.
Secondly the institutions of the state have – again with some interruption, and a measure of help from Arab friends at the time of the Doha Agreement – functioned. State institutions re-established their authority. Some new ones such as the Constitutional Council were established and others like the Higher Judicial Council were strengthened, reflecting the commitment in Taif to enhance the rule of law.
Thirdly, and in stages and contexts which could not have been foreseen at Taif (but that perhaps is in the nature of history), there has been transformational progress with regard to the Agreement’s goal of consolidating the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese State over its territory - including with regard to Parts 3 and 4 of the Agreement which address in the first case, what was then Israel’s occupation of large swathes of South Lebanon; and in the second, relations with Syria - the framework for which changed totally after 2005 after the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Very importantly, since Taif the Lebanese army has developed to become again a truly national entity, representative of all sects, deployed right across the country and commanding nationwide support. Were it not for the diligent efforts made to re-build the army over the past two and a half decades we would be in very dire straits today.
Finally – though Taif has little to say on reconstruction – its commitment to an economic system that is “free.. and guarantees individual initiative and private ownership helped to set the stage for that reconstruction; for the development of financial infrastructure; and for what proved to be, over time, impressive rates of economic growth here.
These are no mean achievements. Against them of course one has to set the unfinished business… the limited nature of the reforms that have been introduced as compared to the ambitious agenda set in Taif, most notably the failure to achieve progress in respect of what the Agreement calls “the abolition of political sectarianism”. And the achievements themselves, whether political, or security, or economic, are now frankly again under great strain because of the impact of another civil war - that in Syria - on Lebanon.
In the past three years we have seen the spillover of that conflict in border areas and terrorist acts elsewhere in the country. As Lebanon grapples with these challenges, and with the presence of over 1.1 million refugees from Syria, politics here have become - if anything - more complicated and polarized. The institutions of the state are under acute pressure. There is a vacancy - not for the first time, but now one of six months’ duration and with no end in sight - in the office of the Presidency, the “symbol of national unity” as Taif calls it. The present government – which was established by consensus across the political spectrum – is as a result grievously handicapped as it struggles to address the multiple challenges facing the country. Parliament has been unable to legislate. It, too, is near the end of its term with the prospect of a possible extension of its mandate, but no sign of movement among its members to address the biggest outstanding political issue, that of the Presidency.
Meanwhile the Army is desperately stretched and under attack viciously from extremists on Lebanon’s eastern border. If ever there was a time for Lebanon’s leaders to set aside their differences – as they did in Taif, and as indeed they did when the present government was formed – it is now. As the members of the International Support Group said in the statement they issued after the meeting the Secretary-General convened last month, a sense of urgency and flexibility is needed on the part of the country’s leaders to elect a president without further delay, to help preserve the achievements of the past 25 years and to sustain the institutions of the state in the face of what are massive challenges.
Surely that must be the priority at present. I am conscious that some will say this is too modest an objective, and perhaps argue that we should not be looking to protect what we have, but to achieve root and branch reform. Such voices however pull in different directions, and in present circumstances consensus is highly unlikely to be achieved around them. But I believe there is consensus as to the need to sustain the relative stability Lebanon presently enjoys, and this in true requires unity, and the give and take needed to ensure the effective functioning of the state institutions passed to us by Speaker Husseini and his colleagues at Taif.
This is not however an argument against any reform. As I said, Taif sets out, as a fundamental national objective, the abolition of political sectarianism - to be complemented at the parliamentary level by the establishment of a senate to represent the interests of the different communities. Lack of substantive progress towards these goals over 25 years suggests the difficulties. But that does not mean that Lebanese should cease to debate their future, or to watch for the moment when such goals can be revisited. Nor does it mean that incremental steps which increase efficiency and remove obstacles to effective government should not be considered. Does it really make sense for example for criteria of sectarian balance to be applied as broadly as at present to public sector jobs, at the expense sometimes of candidates of ability and relevant experience?
Taif envisaged a range of other reforms on which progress has been at best patchy, but where developments during my own brief time here have at least suggested ways forward.
One such relates to parliamentary elections, where last year there was lively discussion of a new electoral law. Draft legislation considered by parliament included a range of proposals for a mixed or proportional electoral system and to strengthen transparency and public confidence. Other ideas were floated - for example to help to increase the number of women candidates. The discussion unfortunately ended in deadlock. But the issue remains very much alive.
Another is administrative decentralization – again an aim highlighted in Taif and one which is I know vigorously advocated by many here. Yesterday I visited the Bekaa and in conversation with municipal leaders and people in several, very different, districts got a strong sense of the interest in local ownership. Earlier this year President Sleiman proposed draft legislation, discussion of which could be an effective entry point to practical reform. It too is presently hostage to the current political impasse.
A third, and crucial example… Taif addressed the issue of arms outside the control of the State, which is central also to the Security Council resolutions I serve and specifically resolution 1701. The resolutions are clear on this, as at first reading is Taif. They point to its centrality to the effort to extend the authority of the state. But the past decade or more has seen no progress. In successive reports to the Security Council, the Secretary-General has encouraged attempts to address the issue through National Dialogue. This is something President Sleiman sought to initiate by submitting in 2012 a draft National Defense Strategy which looked both to the strengthening of national security forces and to the extension of the authority of the state over the use of force. For the sake of Lebanon’s long term security and stability this remains an issue which must be addressed.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
If the organizers succeed through this conference in prompting national discussion about what actions are urgently needed now to protect and sustain the resilience Lebanon has shown over the 25 years since Taif, and especially in the three and half years since the start of the Syrian conflict, they will have done a great service. Beyond that - and although this may not be the moment for radical transformation across the board - there is I believe a desire for progress and change to build systems better able to deliver for the public good, and I have pointed to three areas at least in which ideas recently tabled suggest ways forward.
But in doing so I should make clear that in our view pursuit of these must be Lebanese processes, reflecting the core principles of sovereignty and independence which are the starting point for Taif. The international community is deeply committed to support for Lebanon’s security and stability. The clearest manifestation of this is the United Nations’ investment here. Some 12,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries deployed in UNIFIL to help sustain the calm that has prevailed in the South since 2006. 25 UN agencies based here, many with dramatically increased responsibilities since the start of the Syrian crisis. Whether through the UN or another channels international partners have made almost two billion dollars available to assist refugees and those hosting them have since the crisis began. Politically the support is equally clear in the united messages of support from the Security Council and the International Support Group on issues relating to Lebanon’s security, stability and territorial integrity. In the face of terrorism, and a new and vicious threat on Lebanon’s borders that support has been translated in practical terms into very substantial additional assistance for the Lebanese army and the security forces. But underlying this there is I think another message, sometimes implicit, sometimes articulated. We are with you. We will help. We are keenly interested in one success of your efforts to sustain the institutions of state, to maintain stability. But after 25 years we look to you yourselves to come together and take – in a spirit of unity – the decisions necessary to continue to keep Lebanon safe and to set it on course for a still better future.
Thank you.